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Many research efforts on application of ontology in net-
work security have been done in the past decade. How-
ever, they mostly stop at initial proposal or focus on frame-
work design without detailed representation of intrusion
or attack and relevant detection knowledge with ontology.
In this paper, the design and implementation of Ontology-
Based Knowledge Representation for a Peer-to-Peer Multi-
Agent Distributed Intrusion Detection System (Ontology-
Based MADIDS) are introduced. An example which demon-
strates the representation of an attack with ontology and the
relevant detection process is also presented. In Ontology-
Based MADIDS, ontology technique enables peers in the
system and agents in one peer to share common under-
standing of information. In addition, benefited from agent
technology and P2P architecture, agents in Ontology-Based
MADIDS not only detect attacks on a single host but also in
a distributed domain. These features make the Ontology-
Based MADIDS more flexible and robust.
Keywords - Ontology, Multi-Agent, Peer-to-Peer, Intru-
sion Detection
1 Introduction
Security issues, such as network intrusion and virus in-
fection, are becoming more and more serious with the
growth of computer and network applications. Intrusion is
“a set of actions which attempt to compromise the confiden-
tiality, integrity or availability of a resource” [4]. Currently,
there are various kinds of intrusions and attacks. To effec-
tively detect intrusions or attacks, it is important to formally
represent related knowledge of intrusions and attacks. Tra-
ditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), such as Snort
[12], have a rule base which contains many rules for match-
ing intrusions or attacks. A major drawback of traditional
IDSs is the use of some specific detection language, such as
STATL [15], to define rules which is limited to a syntactic
representation of the rules. This limitation requires that in a
distributed domain each individual IDS implements and in-
terprets the rules with the same detection language in order
to cooperate with each other. However, since IDSs can be
developed by different vendors and different vendors could
exploit different detection languages, the interoperability
among different IDSs may become an obstacle. This short-
coming might be mitigated by using ontology technique be-
cause ontology provides software systems with the ability to
share a common understanding of information and enables
software systems greater abilities to achieve reasoning the
information.
In this paper, Ontology-Based Knowledge Representa-
tion for a P2P Multi-Agent Distributed Intrusion Detec-
tion System (Ontology-Based MADIDS) is proposed. As
a kind of intelligent systems, agent can execute tasks au-
tonomously in dynamic environments. The motivation of
this research is to develop a distributed intrusion detection
system by taking advantage of ontology technique to over-
come some knowledge sharing limitations of current IDSs.
For example, if one peer in Ontology-Based MADIDS de-
tects a new attack, the peer adds the attack as a new in-
stance to the ontology and share the ontology with other
peers in Ontology-Based MADIDS. Compared to other re-
search work, our Ontology-Based MADIDS utilizes on-
tology technique, agent technology and P2P architecture.
Ontology-Based MADIDS not only detects intrusion on a
single host but also in a distributed domain according to
agents cooperation and it can avoid single point failure (i.e.
if the central analyser is cracked by an attacker the whole
system would be destructed) and decrease overhead of each
host due to P2P architecture.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
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tion 2 introduces some related works of this research. In
Section 3, the ontology-based knowledge representation of
each agent in MADIDS is described in detail. An example,
which demonstrates the utility of ontology in representing a
distributed intrusion and the detection process, is presented
in Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded and the further
research is outlined in Section 5.
2 Related work
Some related works on the application of ontology in in-
trusion detection in general are introduced in this section.
Undercoffer et al. [13] produced an ontology specify-
ing a model of computer attack using the DARPA Agent
Markup Language together with Ontology Inference Layer.
They transitioned from traditional taxonomies and attack
languages to ontologies and ontology specification lan-
guages. This is the only work we reviewed which referred
to formally defining ontology for intrusion detection. How-
ever, they only concentrated on building an IDS ontology
on a single host without either detailed representation of in-
trusion or attack with ontology or considering detection in
a distributed domain. In addition, their IDS is deprived of
some of the benefits which an intelligent agent can offer,
such as autonomy and mobility.
Fang et al. [1] presented a novel fraud detection method
based on ontology and ontology instance similarity. Ac-
cording to measure the similarity of ontology instances, the
proposed system can determine whether a user is defrauded.
Compared to other detection methods, this method can re-
duce data model cost. However, they only focused on rep-
resenting user behaviour with ontology rather than repre-
senting intrusion or attack with ontology which will be de-
scribed in this paper.
In [3], the authors proposed a cooperative detection
framework based on the ontology which unified the network
and host features on a single host. Although the detection
becomes more flexible and the global locality information
to support cooperation can be provided, they only consid-
ered information correlation on a single host to detect in-
trusion without between hosts to discover suspicious dis-
tributed intrusion.
According to [10], the authors listed some common tax-
onomies of network security attacks, demonstrated the rela-
tionship between them, and defined an extensible ontology
for network security. However, this paper is just a proposal
to initiate the design of ontology for network security at-
tacks without any details about how to represent each attack
or intrusion with ontology.
Artem Vorobiev and Jun Han [14] described several web
services security threats, such as probing attacks, CDATA
field attacks and so on. In addition, they depicted these at-
tacks ontologies. However, these ontology representations
are comparatively rough and cannot be used in practical
cases.
As introduced in the previous paragraphs, most current
research about ontology for network security lacks rep-
resentation of intrusion or attack and relevant detection
knowledge. Ontology-Based MADIDS, which is intro-
duced in this paper, adopts ontology technique to represent
intrusion and detection knowledge. In this way, peers in
Ontology-Based MADIDS can share their common under-
standing of information due to ontology application and de-
tect distributed intrusion through agent communication and
cooperation.
3 Ontology-Based Knowledge Representa-
tion for MADIDS
In [16], we have presented MADIDS (Multi-Agent Dis-
tributed Intrusion Detection System). MADIDS is com-
posed of six types of agents which are Monitor Agent, Anal-
ysis Agent, Executive Agent, Manager Agent, Retrieval
Agent, and Result Agent. The former four agents are static
agents that are inquiline on hosts, while the latter two are
mobile agents that can travel among hosts. Consideration
of the security and flexibility of the system, each host in
the network has to be equipped with the four static agents
when they join in the network. This system is independent
of specific network architecture. The framework of MA-
DIDS is demonstrated in Figure 1. In order to empower the
interoperability among hosts in MADIDS, Ontology-Based
MADIDS is proposed in this paper. The brief overview of
ontology and the tool used to implement ontology are intro-
duced in subsection 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. The knowl-
edge representation of each agent in Ontology-Based MA-
DIDS is described in detail from subsection 3.3 to 3.6.
3.1 Overview of Ontology
According to Gruber [2], an ontology defines a set of
representational primitives with which to model a domain of
knowledge or discourse. The representational primitives are
typically classes (or sets), attributes (or properties), and re-
lationships (or relations among class members). Therefore,
ontology is designed for the purpose of enabling knowledge
sharing and reuse between entities within a domain. In this
research, these entities are various agents in MADIDS.
RDF (Resource Description Framework) [6] is employed
to depict the ontology graph in this paper. RDF is based
on the idea that the things being described have proper-
ties which have values. The part that identifies the thing
the statement defines is called the subject. The part that
identifies the property or characteristic of the subject that
the statement specifies is called the predicate, and the part
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Figure 1. The components in MADIDS
that identifies the value of that property is called the ob-
ject. For example, in this sentence “champagne is made in
France”, “champagne” is subject, “made in” is predicate,
and “France” is object. In an RDF graph, an ellipse is uti-
lized to denote a class which may have several attributes.
When two classes (ellipses) are connected by a directed
edge, the edge dictates a relationship (predicate) between
the two classes, where the class representing the subject is
denoted by the start of the edge and the class representing
the object is denoted by the end of the edge. Obviously, the
example, “champagne is made in France”, should be repre-
sented as the form in Figure 2.
Figure 2. RDF relationship graph
3.2 Ontology Implementation
Figure 3 presents a high level view of our ontology
which represents the knowledge of each agent in a peer in
MADIDS. The representation of other peers is similar.
The central level of Figure 3 is the class Peer. Peer has
the predicates Current State, Intrusion Pattern, Network En-
vironment and Taking Actions Through. This construction is
predicated upon the notion that the peer (a host in the net-
work) contains attack signatures which are used to detect
suspicious activities from the current state of the peer and it
may need the information from other peers in the network
(network environment) to cooperate detection, and finally
the peer will take actions against the intrusion or attack.
Figure 3. Ontology representation of agent
knowledge in each peer
In [17], we have prototyped MADIDS by using
JACKTM (Java Agent Compiler and Kernel) agent develop-
ment environment. JACKTM [5] is a Java based real time
BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) agent development templet
which provides programming constructs for representing
and implementing reasoning. BDI agent model [9] is built
on a simplified view of human intelligence. BDI agents
have a view of the world (Beliefs), certain goals they wish
to achieve (Desires), and they form Plans (Intentions) to act
on their goals using their accumulated experience. Beliefs
of an agent are information about the environment and also
include inference rules, allowing forward chaining to lead
to new beliefs.
Protege [8] is employed to implement the knowledge
(beliefs) of each agent in Ontology-Based MADIDS. Pro-
tege is a free, open source ontology editor and knowledge-
base framework. Protege ontologies can be exported into
a variety of formats including RDF(S), OWL, XML, and
so on. After implementation of knowledge representation
with Protege, the representation is converted into N-Triples.
The reason for choosing N-Triples is that N-Triples is more
intuitionistic than XML and OWL. N-Triples [7] is a line-
based, plain text format for representing the correct answers
for parsing RDF/XML. The representation of N-Triples is of
the following form:
<Subject> <Predicate> <Object>
The following sessions will describe knowledge repre-
sentation of each agent in detail.
3.3 Knowledge of Monitor Agent
Monitor Agent is a host monitor which fixes at a host.
The responsibility of Monitor Agent is collecting and pre-
processing information of both system audit records and
network traffic for further analysis, such as system file oper-
ation and network connection. Figure 4 shows the ontology
of knowledge of Monitor Agent. The knowledge of Monitor
Agent is System Record which is about system status of the
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host. The class System Record consists of two components,
i.e. Network Flow Record and System Audit Record. From
Figure 4, it can be seen that three classes are defined in the
ontology which are System Record, Network Flow Record
and System Audit Record.
Figure 4. Monitor Agent Knowledge
The class Network Flow Record includes several at-
tributes about network features which are IP address
of remote host (Remote Host), IP address of local host
(Local Host), whether the remote host connects to the lo-
cal host or oppositely (Connected From), the time when the
remote host has a successful connection to the local host
(Connected Time), length (the number of seconds) of the
connection (Duration), type of the protocol which the re-
mote host uses to connect to the local host, e.g. TCP, UDP,
etc (Protocol Type), the number of failed login attempts be-
fore a successful login (Num Failed Logins), whether the re-
mote host successfully logged in the local host (Logged In),
the port number which has been scanned by the remote host
(Port No. Scanned), and the number of scanning to a spe-
cific port in the past two seconds (Port Scan Freq). In Fig-
ure 4, (a) is an example instance of the class Network Flow
Record.
The class System Audit Record is inclusive of attributes
representing the operating system state of the host, such
as memory usage (Mem Total, Mem Idle, and Mem Use),
CPU usage (CPU Load Ave), disk usage (Disk Total and
Disk Use), the number of current users (Num of Users), and
the number of current processes (Num of Processes). In
Figure 4, (b) is an example instance of the class System
Audit Record.
The attribute, Remote Host, representation with N-
Triples (mentioned in subsection 3.2) is shown in Fig-
ure 5 which means Remote Host belongs to the class
Network Flow Record and its type is string. The other at-
tributes representation with N-Triples are analogous.
Figure 5. An Example of N-Triples
3.4 Knowledge of Analysis Agent
Analysis Agent integrates and analyses the information
received from Monitor Agent (in Figure 3, the predicate
Queried by representing this relationship ). In Ontology-
Based MADIDS, on each host, the Analysis Agent contains
many attack signatures which are used to discover intru-
sions or attacks through analysing information from Mon-
itor Agent. When Analysis Agent detects an intrusion or
a attack, it will send a notification to Executive Agent to
quarantine damaged file or cut off network connection. If
Analysis Agent suspects that a distributed attack occurs, it
will request Manager Agent for help.
The knowledge of Analysis Agent is Attack Signature
which is about various intrusion or attack patterns. The
class Attack Signature has two components, including Net-
work Attack and Host Attack. Figure 6 demonstrates the
ontology representation of the three classes. In order to
conveniently communicate and cooperate between Monitor
Agent and Analysis Agent, the attributes of Network Attack
and Host Attack are nearly the same as those of Network
Flow Record and System Audit Record respectively, except
the attributes, Attack Type and Num of Hosts, which are ad-
ditional in Network Attack and Host Attack to specify the
type of an attack and how many hosts need to be detected.
In this research, four subclasses are added to the class Net-
work Attack which are DoS, R2L, U2R and Probe.
i. DoS (Denial of Service) attacks are some malicious
acts that make system, network, application, or information
deny service to their legitimate users, e.g. SYN Flooding
attack.
ii. R2L (Remote-to-Local) means unauthorized access
from a remote machine, e.g., guessing password.
iii. U2R (User-to-Root) means unauthorized access to
local superuser (root) privileges, e.g., various “buffer over-
flow” attacks.
iv. Probing means surveillance and other scanning activ-
ities, e.g., port scanning.
In Figure 6, (a) is an example instance of the class R2L.
3.5 Knowledge of Executive Agent
Executive Agent is responsible for executing tasks
against intrusions or attacks which depend on the type of
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Figure 6. Analysis Agent Knowledge
attack notified by Analysis Agent (in Figure 3, the predicate
Referred by representing this relationship). These tasks in-
clude restoring corrupted files, preventing network connec-
tion, and so on. The knowledge of Executive Agent is Ex-
ecutive Strategy which is about how to take actions against
intrusions or attacks. The example of knowledge represen-
tation with ontology of Executive Agent is demonstrated in
Figure 7.
Figure 7. Executive Agent Knowledge
The attributes of Executive Strategy include type of at-
tack (Attack Type), type of actions to be taken (Action Type),
effect to which target (Target), and extent of the effect (Ex-
tent).
3.6 Knowledge of Manager Agent
As introduced in Subsection 3.1, the Monitor Agent of
a host is the agent that collects information from the host.
However, to detect distributed intrusions, it is not sufficient
to only collect information from a single host. Hence, an-
other three kinds of agents, i.e. Manager Agent, Retrieval
Agent and Result Agent, are included in Ontology-Based
MADIDS to collect related information from multi-hosts in
the network.
The Manager Agent is the agent that manages retrieval
processes. It takes charge of Retrieval Agent and Result
Agent, including generating, dispatching, retracting and
communicating with these two agents. The knowledge of
Manager Agent is Environment Record which is about en-
vironment information of the host. The class Environment
Record has two components, i.e. Neighbour List and Re-
trieval Agent Record. The ontology representation of the
three classes is shown in Figure 8. The class Neighbour
List contains relevant information about neighbour hosts
(one-hop hosts) of the the host which the Manager Agent
resides on. The class Neighbour List has attributes includ-
ing IP addresses of neighbours (Neig IP Addr), host names
of neighbours (Host Name), and MAC addresses of neigh-
bours (MAC Addr). Obviously, the number of neighbours
of a host is equal to the number of records the Neighbour
List contains.
When a host connects/disconnects with another host, the
Manager Agent of the host modifies the Neighbour List by
adding/removing related information to/from the list. In ad-
dition, each Manager Agent has a Retrieval Agent Record
which is used to store Retrieval Agent Identifiers.
Retrieval Agent Identifier (RAID) is used to distinguish
different Retrieval Agents. RAID is also generated by
the Manager Agent. We define it as the format “Host-
Name0001”. “HostName” means the name of the host
which dispatches the Retrieval Agent, while “0001” means
the serial number of the Retrieval Agent, for example, the
first group of Retrieval Agents which perform the same task
is “0001”, the second group is “0002”, and so on. The
class Retrieval Agent Record (RAR) is used to store Re-
trieval Agent Identifiers in order to avoid Retrieval Agent
traveling the hosts which it or other Retrieval Agents with
the same RAID have already visited. The class Retrieval
Agent Record has several attributes, including visited time
(Vis Time), from where (IP Address) and the RAID (RAID).
In Figure 8, (a) and (b) are example instances of the classes
Neighbour List and Retrieval Agent Record respectively.
Figure 8. Manager Agent Knowledge
If a Manager Agent originates the mobile agent travel-
ing detection, this Manager Agent is called as an Initiator.
When an Initiator receives a request from an Analysis Agent
for deciding distributed attack, it will generate and dispatch
Retrieval Agents to inform other hosts to check whether
they have the similar records from the same attacker (in Fig-
ure 3, the predicate Referred by representing this relation-
ship). Then, each Manager Agent of the hosts, which have
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been visited by those Retrieval Agents, will send a Result
Agent back to the Initiator. The Initiator will transfer the in-
formation to the local Analysis Agent. The Analysis Agent
will correlate the information and confirm whether this sus-
picious activity is a distributed attack. If so, the Analysis
Agent informs the Initiator to broadcast this information to
other hosts in the network and notifies the local Executive
Agent to take actions against the attack.
3.7 Knowledge of Retrieval Agent
Retrieval Agent, generated by Manager Agent, moves to
other hosts and lets their Analysis Agents check whether
there are the similar records from the same suspicious re-
mote host. There are four types of knowledge that Re-
trieval Agent needs to maintain, which are source IP ad-
dress from where the original host dispatches this Re-
trieval Agent (Source IP Addr), type of the suspicious at-
tack (Attack Type), remote IP address where the suspicious
attack is from (Remote IP Addr), Retrieval Agent Identifier
(RAID), and Time to Life (TTL). TTL, generated by an Ini-
tiator, is used to demonstrate the number of rest hosts the
Retrieval Agent needs to visit. The Retrieval Agent will be
discarded when the value of TTL reaches zero or there is no
more host to be traveled.
3.8 Knowledge of Result Agent
Result Agent, also generated by Manager Agent, with
a result record will be sent back by each Manager Agent,
which has been visited by the Retrieval Agent, to the Ini-
tiator. The result record contains the information including
source IP address from where the original host dispatches
this Result Agent (Source Host), type of the suspicious at-
tack (Attack Type), whether the original host has similar
records (Similar Record), and if so where these records are
from (Remote Host). Then, the local Analysis Agent which
resides on the same host with Initiator tallies all the result
records to make a final decision.
4 Example
To test our implementation, we created several instances
of the class R2L and Probing in our ontology with Pro-
tege and maintained them as the knowledge of Analysis
Agent. These instances are specific intrusions or attacks,
such as Doorknob-Rattling, Chain/Loop-Attack and Dis-
tributed Port-Scanning. Due to the space limitation, we
only present the detection of Doorknob-Rattling attack as
an example. The sponsor of Doorknob-Rattling attack [11]
tries a very few common username and password combi-
nations on several computers that results in very few failed
attempts on each computer. This type of attack is hard to be
detected unless the data related to failed login attempts are
collected and correlated from all hosts in the network. The
N-Triples representation of suspicious Doorknob-Rattling
attack is illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9. N-Triples Notation for Suspicious
Doorknob-Rattling Attack
In Figure 9, it is noted that Doorknob-Rattling is an in-
stance of R2L and in this attack the victim host is connected
from a remote host, the number of failed login attempt is at
least 5, and the login is finally successful.
In order to query for the existence of a suspicious
Doorknob-Rattling attack, a rule should be defined which
tests for the number of failed login attempts before a suc-
cessful login. The query in Figure 10 performs this test
in JACKTM syntax. If the attributes, Connected From
and Logged In, of any instance in the class System Record
matches the query, other attributes of that instance are in-
stantiated. Then, the test about whether the number of failed
login is more than 5 will be executed on each matched
instance. If so, that instance is a suspicious Doorknob-
Rattling attack and the relevant information will be sent to
Manager Agent to request help. The relevant information
includes the type of attack, the IP address of remote host
which connects to the local host, and the number of hosts
which need to be visited.
An example that shows the operation of Ontology-Based
MADIDS is presented as follows. The Figure 11 is an ex-
ample of a P2P network (such as Ad hoc network) which
has four hosts to be attacked by a remote host simulta-
neously. This type of attack is Doorknob-Rattling attack
which has been described above.
In this example, it is supposed that Host 1 detects a suspi-
cious Doorknob-Rattling attack through the query approach
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Figure 10. Query for suspicious Doorknob-
Rattling Attack
Figure 11. An Example of P2P Network
described above and originates a detection process. First,
Host 1 decides how many hosts (say N) the Retrieval Agent
should visit which depends on the specific attack type (sup-
pose N=5 in this example). Then, it compares the number
of neighbours it has (say M, obviously, M=2 in this exam-
ple, namely Host 2 and Host 3) with the number of hosts the
Retrieval Agent needs to visit. Since the number of neigh-
bours is less than the number of hosts the Retrieval Agent
needs to travel, namely 2<5, Host 1 generates M (M=2) Re-
trieval Agents with the same RAID and the same TTL=N-
M+1=4 (mentioned in subsection 3.6 and 3.7 respectively)
and sends them to Host 2 and Host 3 respectively. Then,
Host 2 and Host 3 randomly select a host from their neigh-
bours (the neighbours of Host 2 are Host 1 and Host 4, and
the neighbours of Host 3 are Host 1 and Host 5), and re-
transmits the Retrieval Agent to the next host. In order to
avoid Retrieval Agent repeatedly traveling the hosts which
it or other Retrieval Agents with the same RAID has/have
visited, the Manager Agent on each host has a RAR (refer
to subsection 3.6). If there does not exist a same RAID
in the RAR, the Manager Agent on that host just commu-
nicates with this Retrieval Agent, performs tasks, minuses
1 from the Retrieval Agents TTL value, and retransmits
this Retrieval Agent to next host. Otherwise, the host will
send the Retrieval Agent back to the previous host which
just dispatched the Retrieval Agent, but does not minus the
TTL value of this Retrieval Agent. Then, the previous host
chooses another neighbour host to send this Retrieval Agent
to. When the value of TTL reaches zero or there is no more
host to visit, the process will stop. Then those hosts, visited
by Retrieval Agent, will send Result Agents with necessary
information back to Host 1. Host 1 will make a final deci-
sion based on the information it received. Finally, it broad-
casts the attack information to all other hosts in the network
and takes actions against the attack. On the other hand, if
the number of neighbours is more than the number of hosts
the Retrieval Agent needs to travel, namely M>N, Host 1
just generates N Retrieval Agents with the same RAID and
TTL = 1 for all of them. Then, Host 1 randomly selects N
hosts from its M neighbours and sends N Retrieval Agents
to the N hosts respectively. The Figure 12 provides an intu-
itionistic demonstration of Ontology-Based MADIDS oper-
ation in UML notation. The detailed detection process can
be found in our previous paper [16].
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, the design and implementation of
ontology-based knowledge representation for MADIDS
were described. An example, which shows the attack
representation with ontology and detection process with
JACKTM , was also presented. Compared to current re-
lated research, Ontology-Based MADIDS combines ontol-
ogy technique, agent technology and P2P architecture to-
gether in order to empower the system to share common
knowledge among different peers in the network and differ-
ent agents in one peer. In addition, agent cooperation en-
ables the system to not only detect attacks on a single host
but also in a distributed domain and P2P architecture makes
the framework more flexible and robust. The future work
of this research is to develop detailed detection strategies
against complicated distributed intrusions or attacks and test
the Ontology-Based MADIDS in real cases.
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